

# Housing Assistance and Labor Supply: The Case of Rent Control

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Discussant:

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AREUEA 2026

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- ▶ **Key Question:** How does residing in RC unit affect LS?
- ▶ **Approach:** IV, variation in RC unit availability at move-in
- ▶ **Main Finding:** RC residence reduces hours by 5-8hr/wk, 13-20%
  - ▶ Insignificant but negative extensive margin effect
  - ▶ Little evidence of heterogeneity in effect, stable across specifications
- ▶ **Thoughts:** would be great to know why lower LS, would like to see income / wage differences

- ▶ RS regulates rent increases, not levels
  - ▶ Subsidy accumulates with tenure → heterogeneous in dollars
  - ▶ Tied to unit, not tenant → lock-in
- ▶ Cool setting for looking at 'non-labor income' effect on LS
  - ▶ Not means tested → no substitution effect from phase-out
  - ▶ Not observable by employers → no wage-setting response
  - ▶ Permanent (if stay put) → income effect should operate through PIH
- ▶ Biggest worry: self-selection on labor demand
  - ▶ Low-LD types may search harder for RS units in every period
  - ▶ Hard to test directly without earnings history

## A Simple Model: Housing Costs and Labor Supply

Housing services  $H$  are fixed, but the out-of-pocket price  $p$  can change:

$$\text{Budget: } c \leq wl - pH. \quad (1)$$

Question: How does labor supply respond when  $p$  falls?

Compare two utility specifications:

$$\text{Model 1 } u_1 = c + \beta \ln(1 - l) + \gamma \ln(H) \quad (2)$$

vs

$$\text{Model 2 } u_2 = \alpha \ln(c) + \beta \ln(1 - l) + \gamma \ln(H) \quad (3)$$

## Model 1: Quasi-Linear Consumption

The first-order condition is  $w - \frac{\beta}{1-l} = 0$ . Thus,

$$l^* = 1 - \frac{\beta}{w} \implies \frac{\partial l^*}{\partial p} = 0. \quad (4)$$

With quasi-linear consumption (no diminishing returns), a lower housing price does not change labor supply.

## Model 2: Log Utility over Consumption

Conditional on fixed  $H$ , the interior labor supply is

$$l^* = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} + \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta} \frac{pH}{w}. \quad (5)$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial l^*}{\partial p} = \frac{\beta H}{(\alpha + \beta)w} > 0. \quad (6)$$

So a fall in housing price reduces labor supply:  $dp < 0 \Rightarrow dl^* < 0$ .

With diminishing marginal utility of consumption:

$$\text{lower } p \Rightarrow \text{higher } c \text{ and more leisure.} \quad (7)$$

# Magnitude Context for Treatment Effect

It would be nice to help calibrate magnitude of effect

- ▶ Authors cite Chen et al that RS subsidy is  $\approx \$5 - 8k/\text{year}$
- ▶ How does the lost labor income (at current wages) compare?
- ▶ Back of the envelope:
  - ▶ 5hr/week  $\rightarrow \approx 260\text{hr}/\text{year}$
  - ▶ 8hr/week  $\rightarrow \approx 416\text{hr}/\text{year}$
  - ▶ NYC Minimum wage  $\approx \$17$  so  $\approx \$4,400 - 7,000/\text{year}$ ?
  - ▶ At NYC Median  $\approx \$30$  so  $\approx \$8,000 - 13,000/\text{year}$ ?
- ▶ How does it compare to prior papers?

## Exclusion Restriction Thoughts

If those who select into RS treatment face systematically lower labor demand in every period, then can get the same negative labor supply results

- ▶ Authors control for "at move-in" market factors, but this issue is at individual level
- ▶ JQY (2025) find balance across demographics, but do not show earned income / wage balance
- ▶ It would be nice to see balance here as well
- ▶ It would also help show that mechanism is non-labor income

# Stable Treatment Effects

The treatment effects are very stable across specifications

- ▶ On the one hand, stronger case for  $Z$  independent of other market factors
- ▶ On the other, is it because there isn't much variation within sub-borough (as  $Z$  is mostly at the borough level)?

Is there heterogeneity wrt tenure or income?

- ▶ longer tenure should imply bigger subsidy
- ▶ greater income at the same rent implies smaller subsidy (?)

# Conclusion

Paper is extremely well executed

- ▶ Neat setting to test labor supply responses
- ▶ I really like the explanation of estimating MTE

Bigger-picture question for future work:

- ▶ Welfare: are these labor-supply reductions a feature (more leisure for liquidity-constrained renters) or a cost (mismatch, lock-in)?

Good luck!