Published and Accepted
Is the Rent Too High: Land Ownership and Monopoly Power (2026)
with Oren Ziv
Accepted, Real Estate Economics
Abstract
Pricing power in real estate markets can reduce housing supply and redevelopment relative to the social optimum. We show how popular redevelopment subsidies and zoning regulations interact with pricing power. Using building-level rental income data from NYC, we find that increasing concentration is correlated with increasing prices. Finally, we use the model to estimate the first building-level housing elasticity, finding that markups account for between ten and thirty percent of rents in the city.A Test for Pricing Power in Urban Housing Markets (2025)
with Oren Ziv
Accepted, Review of Economics and Statistics
Abstract
The presence of pricing power in housing markets significantly impacts our understanding of the housing supply. It biases estimates of housing production functions, supply elasticities, and the effects of land-use policies as well as the results of quantitative spatial models. We test for the existence of pricing power in the New York City rental market. Using tax policy changes, we conduct complementary difference-in-differences and instrumental variable analyses. An idiosyncratic increase in a single building’s costs leads to a proportional rent increase, holding market-level rents constant. Our findings support the existence of pricing power and challenge the prevailing perfect competition framework.Measuring the Demand for Land Under Sorting and Matching (2020)
with Oren Ziv
Chapter, Measuring the Effectiveness of Real Estate Regulation, Levine-Schnur, R. (eds)
Abstract
This paper investigates nonparametric identification of demand in markets with two-sided sorting. We consider any situation where the price of a good depends on the sorting of buyers. Specifically, we consider the case where willingness to pay for local amenities differs by income group and monopolistic landlords use a pricing rule based on marginal cost and price elasticities. We first show that generally demand parameters cannot be identified, thus all identification is based on a priori exclusion restrictions or functional form on demand or pricing rules. One example is that if cost shifters are assumed additively separable in marginal cost, then the model can be identified. Such restrictions may be warranted in specific research questions, but researchers should consider and be clear about the implicit additional structure placed on the model.Working Papers
When Does Market Definition Matter for Identification? (April 2026)Abstract
Market definition is central to demand estimation, merger simulation, and welfare analysis, yet in practice it is often chosen by researcher judgment. This paper asks when that choice matters for identification of the price coefficient. The utility parameters of aggregate logit demand can be estimated consistently without specifying the true market, provided the researcher observes a finer nested grouping and uses sufficiently fine fixed effects. This delivers a consistent benchmark against which candidate market definitions can be compared via a cluster-robust extension of the test of Papke & Wooldridge (2023) to instrumental variables. The diagnostic rejects when candidate misspecification distorts the relevant IV moment for the coefficient of interest, and remains silent when it does not. Monte Carlo evidence and an application to U.S. domestic airline demand illustrate the framework. The approach brings a foundational modeling choice within the econometric analysis rather than treating it as a maintained assumption.with Mark Kutzbach, Gary Wagner
Abstract
Spatial markets are typically measured using administrative boundaries chosen for convenience rather than grounded in economic behavior. We estimate tract-level banking concentration using a structural model of household deposit allocation, yielding heterogeneous and overlapping catchment areas. This approach reveals that 89% of variation in local competitive conditions occurs across neighborhoods within MSAs rather than between MSAs. Monte Carlo merger simulations reveal that coarse market definitions can mask localized competitive harm: 2.6% of simulated mergers pass MSA-level screening thresholds while substantially increasing concentration in ten or more neighborhoods. These false negatives arise systematically when merging firms serve similar customers but operate spatially segmented networks. For understanding competition in any spatially differentiated market, knowing where a household lives within a market matters more than knowing which market it lives in.Selected Work in Progress
Measuring Local Liquid Savings
with M.Kutzbach, G.Wagner
Estimating Markups using Pass-Through Regressions
with Oren Ziv
A Test for Collusion in Housing Markets Using Algorithmic Pricing
with Abram Handler, Christophe Spaenjers, and Oren Ziv
CBDC News and Market Sentiment
with Sam Borkhoche, Julieta Yung
(Paused)
Dissertation Work
The General Equilibrium Incidence of the Earned Income Tax Credit
Abstract
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a $67 billion tax expenditure that subsidizes 20% of all workers. Yet all prior analysis uses partial equilibrium assumptions on gross wages. I derive the general equilibrium incidence of wage subsidies and quantify the importance of EITC spillovers in three ways. I calculate the GE incidence of the 1993 and 2009 EITC expansions using new elasticity estimates. I contrast the incidence of counterfactual EITC and Welfare expansions. I quantify the effect of equalizing the EITC for workers with and without children. In all cases, I find spillovers are economically meaningful.The Local Effects of State EITC Expansions
Abstract
Twenty eight states spend $4 billion to supplement the federal Earned Income Tax Credit, with several justifying the tax expenditure as a pro-work incentive. Yet no systematic evaluation of these supplements exists. I use state border policy variation to identify state supplements effects. I first document that subsidy rates are greater when a state’s neighbor already has a supplement. Next, I assess whether supplements affect county level EITC take-up, migration, commuting, employment, and earnings. Estimates are sensitive to the estimation design and sample used. While supplements increase benefits to low-income workers, results fail to provide robust evidence of increased economic activity.Abstract
Zoutman, Gavrilova, & Hopland (Econometrica, 2018) show that by knowing on ‘which side of the market’ an ‘exogenous’ tax is levied one can use a single tax instrument to estimate both a supply and a demand elasticity. This seemingly goes against the intuition that one needs two instruments for two parameters; i.e., a ‘supply’ and a ‘demand’ instrument. I show that the result is only true with partial equilibrium assumptions. Without further assumptions, tax reform induced general equilibrium price spillover effects imply that the tax rates are correlated with the unobserved structural errors. Thus, tax rates on their own are invalid instruments for at least one of the parameters. However, I show that if one can calculate a measure of spillovers, then one can still estimate the two elasticities using one tax reform, but with the spillover measure as an additional instrument.Conference Discussions
Housing Assistance and Labor Supply: The Case of Rent Control by Huan Deng, Hanchen Jiang, and Xi Yang
AREUEA, May 2026Supervision and De Novo Banks’ Charter Choice by Ethan Butler, Jeffery Gerlach, Ping McLemore
IRQF, 2025GSE Redistribution Effects: The Home Purchase Effects of GSE Redistribution by Kim, Liu & Zhang
AREUEA, May 2025Mortgage Lock-In and Home Sales Volume Dynamics by Joshua Abel
AREUEA, May 2025Priced Out: Rent Control, Wages, and Inequality by Cerquiero, Hacamo, and Raposo
AREUEA, May 2024Two-Sided Sorting of Workers and Firms by Guangbin Hong
AREUEA, May 2024Buy-to-Live vs. Buy-to-Let: The Impact of Real Estate Investors on Housing Costs and Neighborhoods by Francke, Hans, Korevaar & van Bekkum
AREUEA-ASSA, Jan 2024Keeping Up with the Blackstones: Institutional Investors and Gentrification by Neroli Austin
Georgetown-Clark Symposium on Global Real Estate, Oct 2023The Skyscraper Revolution by Ahlfeldt, Baum-Snow & Jedwab
AREUEA, May 2023More Tax, Less Refi? The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Monetary Policy Pass-Through by Tess Scharlemann and Eileen van Straelen
NTA, Nov 2023Unreserved: The Surprising New Fiscal Powers of Central Banks by Brian Galle
NTA, Nov 2023Racial Discrimination and Housing Outcomes in the United States Rental Market by Christensen, Sarmiento-Barbieri & Timmins
UEA, Nov 2022